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Epistemology

Epistemology
1. The Varieties of Cognitive Success There are many different kinds of cognitive success, and they differ from one another along various dimensions. Exactly what these various kinds of success are, and how they differ from each other, and how they are explanatorily related to each other, and how they can be achieved or obstructed, are all matters of controversy. 1.1 What Kinds of Things Enjoy Cognitive Success? Cognitive successes can differ from each other by virtue of qualifying different kinds of things. Some of the recent controversies concerning the objects of cognitive success concern the metaphysical relations among the cognitive successes of various kinds of objects: Does the cognitive success of a process involve anything over and above the cognitive success of each state in the succession of states that comprise the execution of that process? 1.2 Constraints and Values We’ve used the term “constraint” to denote the bounds of what is epistemically permissible. 1.4. 2. 3. 4. 5. Related:  History of Philosophy, Definitions, Concepts

untitled en.m.wikipedia Branch of philosophy concerning knowledge In these debates and others, epistemology aims to answer questions such as "What do people know?", "What does it mean to say that people know something?", "What makes justified beliefs justified?", and "How do people know that they know?"[4][1][5][6] Specialties in epistemology ask questions such as "How can people create formal models about issues related to knowledge?" Etymology[edit] The etymology of the word epistemology is derived from the ancient Greek epistēmē, meaning "knowledge, understanding, skill, scientific knowledge",[7][note 1] and the English suffix -ology, meaning "the science or discipline of (what is indicated by the first element)".[9] The word "epistemology" first appeared in 1847, in a review in New York's Eclectic Magazine : The title of one of the principal works of Fichte is 'Wissenschaftslehre,' which, after the analogy of technology ... we render epistemology.[10] Historical and philosophical context[edit] Knowledge[edit]

Belief First published Mon Aug 14, 2006; substantive revision Sun Nov 21, 2010 Contemporary analytic philosophers of mind generally use the term “belief” to refer to the attitude we have, roughly, whenever we take something to be the case or regard it as true. To believe something, in this sense, needn't involve actively reflecting on it: Of the vast number of things ordinary adults believe, only a few can be at the fore of the mind at any single time. Nor does the term “belief”, in standard philosophical usage, imply any uncertainty or any extended reflection about the matter in question (as it sometimes does in ordinary English usage). Many of the things we believe, in the relevant sense, are quite mundane: that we have heads, that it's the 21st century, that a coffee mug is on the desk. Most contemporary philosophers characterize belief as a “propositional attitude”. 1. 1.1 Representationalism It is also common to suppose that beliefs play a causal role in the production of behavior. 1.1.1.

Partially Examined Life Podcast - Pat Churchland (and Hume) Podcast: Play in new window | Download (Duration: 1:44:57 — 96.1MB) We spoke with Patricia Churchland after reading her new book Braintrust: What Neuroscience Tells Us About Morality. We also discussed David Hume’s ethics as foundational to her work, reading his Treatise on Human Nature (1739), Book III, Part I and his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751), Section V, Parts I and II. What does the physiology of the brain have to do with ethics? What bearing do facts have on values? Churchland thinks that while Hume is (famously) correct in saying that you can’t deduce “ought” from “is,” the fact that we have moral sentiments is certainly relevant to figuring out what our ethical positions should be, and it’s her main goal to figure out what the mechanisms behind those moral sentiments are: What brain parts and processes are involved? To read along with us, buy Pat’s book. End song: “Bring You Down” from the 1994 album Happy Songs Will Bring You Down by The MayTricks. by

Allegory of the Cave Plato realizes that the general run of humankind can think, and speak, etc., without (so far as they acknowledge) any awareness of his realm of Forms. The allegory of the cave is supposed to explain this. In the allegory, Plato likens people untutored in the Theory of Forms to prisoners chained in a cave, unable to turn their heads. All they can see is the wall of the cave. Behind them burns a fire. Between the fire and the prisoners there is a parapet, along which puppeteers can walk. From Great Dialogues of Plato (Warmington and Rouse, eds.) Here are some students’ illustrations of Plato’s Cave Go back to lecture on the Phaedo Go back to lecture on the “One Over Many” Argument Go to next lecture on Criticism of Forms Need a quick review of the Theory of Forms? Return to the PHIL 320 Home Page Copyright © 2006, S.

The Roots of Consciousness: History, The Age of Enlightenment The Age of Enlightenment Descartes and Mind-Body Dualism Rene Descartes Rene Descartes (1596-1650), who was certainly not an occult scholar or even a sympathizer, nevertheless attributed all of his philosophic ideas to images that appeared to him either in dreams or when he was in the hypnogogic state just before awakening. (In fact, he had to "prove his visibility" to keep from being associated with the Invisible College. The association of creativity with dreaaming apparently gave rise to public speculation about an actual college, perhaps diabolical, that dreamers visited in their sleep.) Mind body dualism was first formally stated in modern philosophy by Descartes. Leibnitz and Monadology Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnitz Carrying on the Pythagorean-Platonic doctrine of universal harmony, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnitz, who with Isaac Newton was the co-inventor of calculus, developed an elegant grand philosophy based on the concept of an evolving unit of consciousness called the monad. Idealism . .

www.britannica Most people have noticed that vision can play tricks. A straight stick submerged in water looks bent, though it is not; railroad tracks seem to converge in the distance, but they do not; and a page of English-language print reflected in a mirror cannot be read from left to right, though in all other circumstances it can. Each of those phenomena is misleading in some way. Although such anomalies may seem simple and unproblematic at first, deeper consideration of them shows that just the opposite is true. One possible answer is to say that vision is not sufficient to give knowledge of how things are. Another possible response would begin by granting that none of the senses is guaranteed to present things as they really are. Clearly, there is a network of difficulties here, and one will have to think hard in order to arrive at a compelling defense of the apparently simple claim that the stick is truly straight.

Epistemic Logic First published Wed Jan 4, 2006 Epistemic logic is the logic of knowledge and belief. It provides insight into the properties of individual knowers, has provided a means to model complicated scenarios involving groups of knowers and has improved our understanding of the dynamics of inquiry. 1. The Logic of Individual Knowers Epistemic logic gets its start with the recognition that expressions like ‘knows that’ or ‘believes that’ have systematic properties that are amenable to formal study. Modern treatments of the logic of knowledge and belief grow out of the work of a number of philosophers and logicians writing from 1948 through the 1950s. While this article deals with modern developments, epistemic logic has a venerable history. Contemporary epistemic logic may appear quite technical and removed from traditional epistemological reflections. For the most part, epistemic logic focuses on propositional knowledge. and similarly for belief for some arbitrary proposition A. (1) KcA → A, 2. 3.

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