David Chalmers David John Chalmers (/ˈtʃælmərz/;[1] born 20 April 1966) is an Australian philosopher and cognitive scientist specializing in the area of philosophy of mind and philosophy of language. He is Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Centre for Consciousness at the Australian National University. He is also Professor of Philosophy at New York University.[2] In 2013, he was elected a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences. Life[edit] Since 2004, Chalmers has been Professor of Philosophy, Director of the Centre for Consciousness, and an ARC Federation Fellow at the Australian National University. A Rhodes Scholar raised in Australia, Chalmers received his PhD at Indiana University Bloomington under Douglas Hofstadter. He is the lead singer of the Zombie Blues band which performed at the Qualia Fest in 2012.[5] in New York. Thought[edit] Philosophy of mind[edit] With Andy Clark, Chalmers has written The Extended Mind, an article about the borders of the mind.[7] "Water is H2O"
Daniel Dennett Un article de Wikipédia, l'encyclopédie libre. Daniel Clement Dennett est un philosophe américain né le à Boston. C'est l'un des plus importants philosophes contemporains, en philosophie de l'esprit et en philosophie des sciences, et tout particulièrement en ce qui concerne les retombées de la théorie de l'évolution (Darwin's Dangerous Idea) et son refus dans quelques milieux religieux interprété à la lumière des sciences cognitives, ces dernières constituant son sujet de prédilection (Consciousness Explained, The Mind's "I", ...). Biographie[modifier | modifier le code] Ami de Richard Dawkins, il déclare cependant dans The Atheism Tapes (BBC) ne pas partager son avis sur l'intérêt de lutter contre les religions, estimant que Dawkins « sous-estime le désarroi qui s'emparerait d'une grande partie de la population » si elle devait affronter l'existence sans ce secours. Il précise que cela ne remet pas en cause son athéisme personnel. Les travaux de Dennett[modifier | modifier le code]
La Conscience expliquée Un article de Wikipédia, l'encyclopédie libre. La Conscience expliquée est un livre publié par Daniel Dennett en 1991, tentant d'expliquer ce qu'est la conscience et ses mécanismes en faisant largement appel aux sciences cognitives. La traduction française du livre, assurée par Pascal Engel, fut publiée aux Éditions Odile Jacob en 1993. En fondant son argumentation sur les connaissances récentes en informatique, en psychologie et en neurosciences, Dennett propose une théorie de la conscience qu'il baptise « modèle des versions multiples (en) ». Selon cette théorie des faits simples comme élaborer la prochaine phrase que l'on va énoncer ou faire un choix ne sont en réalité qu'un résultat obtenu au terme d'une compétition darwinienne. Portail de la psychologie
Consciousness Explained Consciousness Explained is a 1991 book by the American philosopher Daniel Dennett which offers an account of how consciousness arises from interaction of physical and cognitive processes in the brain. Synopsis[edit] The book puts forward a "multiple drafts" model of consciousness, suggesting that there is no single central place (a "Cartesian Theater") where conscious experience occurs; instead there are "various events of content-fixation occurring in various places at various times in the brain".[1] The brain consists of a "bundle of semi-independent agencies";[2] when "content-fixation" takes place in one of these, its effects may propagate so that it leads to the utterance of one of the sentences that make up the story in which the central character is one's "self". Dennett's view of consciousness is that it is the apparently serial account for the brain's underlying parallelism. One of the book's more controversial claims is that qualia do not (and cannot) exist. [edit] See also[edit]
Hard problem of consciousness The existence of a "hard problem" is controversial and has been disputed by some philosophers.[4][5] Providing an answer to this question could lie in understanding the roles that physical processes play in creating consciousness and the extent to which these processes create our subjective qualities of experience.[3] Several questions about consciousness must be resolved in order to acquire a full understanding of it. These questions include, but are not limited to, whether being conscious could be wholly described in physical terms, such as the aggregation of neural processes in the brain. If consciousness cannot be explained exclusively by physical events, it must transcend the capabilities of physical systems and require an explanation of nonphysical means. Formulation of the problem[edit] Chalmers' formulation[edit] In Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness, Chalmers wrote:[3] Easy problems[edit] Other formulations[edit] Various formulations of the "hard problem": T.H. Responses[edit]
Cartesian theater Objects experienced are represented within the mind of the observer The Cartesian theater is a derisive term coined by philosopher and cognitive scientist Daniel Dennett to pointedly refer to a defining aspect of what he calls Cartesian materialism, which he considers to be the often unacknowledged remnants of Cartesian dualism in modern materialistic theories of the mind. Descartes originally claimed that consciousness requires an immaterial soul, which interacts with the body via the pineal gland of the brain. Dennett says that, when the dualism is removed, what remains of Descartes' original model amounts to imagining a tiny theater in the brain where a homunculus (small person), now physical, performs the task of observing all the sensory data projected on a screen at a particular instant, making the decisions and sending out commands. (cf. the Homunculus argument). See also[edit] References[edit] External links[edit] Richard Chappell on "The Cartesian Theater"
Homunculus argument The reason why this is a fallacy may be understood by asking how the homunculus 'sees' the internal movie. The obvious answer is that there is another homunculus inside the first homunculus's 'head' or 'brain' looking at this 'movie'. But how does this homunculus see the 'outside world'? In order to answer this, we are forced to posit another homunculus inside this other homunculus's head and so forth. In other words, we are in a situation of infinite regress. Homunculus arguments in terms of rules[edit] Now, in terms of (say) chess, the players are given 'rules' (i.e. the rules of chess) to follow. This is important because it is often assumed in cognitive science that rules and algorithms are essentially the same: in other words, the theory that cognition is rule bound is often believed to imply that thought (cognition) is essentially the manipulation of algorithms, and this is one of the key assumptions of some varieties of artificial intelligence. Counterarguments[edit]
Homunculus Alchemical processes were symbolically illustrated using images of humans and animals inside of vessels. This contributed to the legend of the homunculus.[1] (Pretiosissimum Donum Dei 15th century.) Homunculus (masculine, Latin for "little man", plural: "homunculi"; from the diminutive of homo) is a term used, generally, in various fields of study to refer to any representation of a small human being. Popularized in sixteenth century alchemy and nineteenth century fiction, it has historically referred to the creation of a miniature, fully formed human. The concept has roots in preformationism as well as earlier folklore and alchemic traditions. Currently, in scientific fields, a homunculus may refer to any scale model of the human body that, in some way, illustrates physiological, psychological, or other abstract human characteristics or functions. History[edit] Folklore[edit] In Liber de imaginibus, Paracelsus however denies that roots shaped like men grow naturally. Preformationism[edit]