This is a fast software implementation in C of the FIPS 180-2 hash algorithms SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512. The code is distributed under the BSD license. For each algorithm the implementation has been verified with the NIST test vectors and with the additional vectors provided by Aaron D. Gifford. News: February 2, 2007: Add new optimizations and minor bug fix. May 23, 2005: Include support of SHA-224. April 30, 2005: First release. Download: sha2.tar.gz github: Users: This SHA-2 version is used in Adobe AIR (see license file), in Cisco ASA 5500 Series Software (license), in HP Compliance Log Warehouse (license), or in Yahoo! Compilation options: There is an UNROLL_LOOPS option which is disabled by default. Performances: SHA-256 can achieve hashing at 27 cycles per byte for long size data on a Pentium 4 with the Intel compiler. Arch: Pentium 4 (Prescott), compiler: icc 8.1, compiler options: -O2 -xP -ip, software options: -DUNROLL_LOOPS Portability:
Secure Quick Reliable Login The first time you use SQRL the app will require you to invent a master password, from which a Master Key is cryptographically generated. This Key is a 256-bit (very very large) random number, unique and never shared. Additionally the first time using SQRL a public Identity Lock Key and a private Identity Unlock Key pair are generated via the SQRL app. The Identity Lock Key is stored alongside the Master Key but the Identity Unlock Key must be safely stored away (such as printing it as a QR code) prior to being deleted from the app. The Identity Unlock Key is used to cancel and replace your Master Key in the event that it is compromised. When you visit a SQRL enabled website the QR code/link contains the website address and a random cryptographic challenge number. The SQRL app hashes the website address and your Master Key together to create a website unique identity. Once the signed random cryptographic challenge is verified by the website it is then able to authenticate your device.
/cfAES: Compact Framework and Rijndael / AES 7/19/2004 Introduction the table below shows the different crypto algorithms listed on the left, and where they live. X means that it is supported, 0 means partial support. you can see that System.Security.Cryptography for CFv2 is going to lack many algorithms compared to the desktop. OpenNETCF 1.2 and the /cfAes library are intended to be used together, to provide almost all of the crypto functionality of .NET 2005 (desktop) RijndaelManaged, RijndaelCryptoServiceProvider 1st off, i think it is pronounced 'rain doll' :) i'm not certain of the history, but Rijndael and AES are related. something to the effect of Rijndael being the candidate for what is now known as AES. AES, EBC, NoPadding, KeyWrap the Rijndeal implementations above were tested against WSE 2.0. TripleDesEx, NoPadding, KeyWrap the TripleDES KeyWrap implementation was brought over from the WSE bits (where it was tested). SHA256Managed, SHA384Managed, SHA512Managed, SHA1Managed SecureString
authentication - Could SQRL really be as secure as they say Overall, the protocol does not appear to increase security over existing technology. If you are looking for the best way to protect your identity online, this is without question not it. But let's go over the pros and cons: It's impossible to "share" a password in the narrow sense that a malicious website can't use the authentication provided to one site to log in to another site. A brute-force attack against the authentication token is not feasible. Credentials are not stored on your computer. This technique is dangerously susceptible to MITM attacks and social engineering. So, for example, a phishing site can display an authentic login QR code which logs in the attacker instead of the user. This technique combines both authentication and identity into a physical object which is frequently lost or stolen. This technique combines all your authentication tokens into a single key unless you manually create others.
CertCreateSelfSignCertificate Function Syntax PCCERT_CONTEXT WINAPI CertCreateSelfSignCertificate( _In_opt_ HCRYPTPROV_OR_NCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE hCryptProvOrNCryptKey, _In_ PCERT_NAME_BLOB pSubjectIssuerBlob, _In_ DWORD dwFlags, _In_opt_ PCRYPT_KEY_PROV_INFO pKeyProvInfo, _In_opt_ PCRYPT_ALGORITHM_IDENTIFIER pSignatureAlgorithm, _In_opt_ PSYSTEMTIME pStartTime, _In_opt_ PSYSTEMTIME pEndTime, PCERT_EXTENSIONS pExtensions ); Parameters hCryptProvOrNCryptKey [in, optional] pSubjectIssuerBlob [in] dwFlags [in] A set of flags that override the default behavior of this function. pKeyProvInfo [in, optional] If the pKeyProvInfo parameter is not NULL, the corresponding values are set in the CERT_KEY_PROV_INFO_PROP_ID value of the generated certificate. pSignatureAlgorithm [in, optional] pStartTime [in, optional] pEndTime [in, optional] pExtensions [optional] Return value Requirements See also
Diffie–Hellman key exchange The scheme was first published by Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman in 1976.[2] By 1975, James H. Ellis,[3] Clifford Cocks and Malcolm J. Williamson within GCHQ, the British signals intelligence agency, had also shown how public-key cryptography could be achieved; however, their work was kept secret until 1997.[4] Although Diffie–Hellman key agreement itself is an anonymous (non-authenticated) key-agreement protocol, it provides the basis for a variety of authenticated protocols, and is used to provide perfect forward secrecy in Transport Layer Security's ephemeral modes (referred to as EDH or DHE depending on the cipher suite). U.S. Name[edit] In 2002, Hellman suggested the algorithm be called Diffie–Hellman–Merkle key exchange in recognition of Ralph Merkle's contribution to the invention of public-key cryptography (Hellman, 2002), writing: The system...has since become known as Diffie–Hellman key exchange. Description[edit] Illustration of the Diffie–Hellman Key Exchange , and . .
CSP: du natif au managé Afin de gérer les objets cryptographiques dans Windows, Microsoft met à la disposition des développeurs la Crypto API qui est loin d'être simple d'utilisation. Fournir une interface plus simple à utiliser à partir du Framework .Net n'était pas une chose facile, mais Microsoft s'est quand même lancé dans l'exercice avec .Net 1 et a renforcé sa position avec le Framework 2.0. Premier constat : tout ce qui est faisable en natif ne l'est pas en managé, des choix ont du être fait ! Pour rappel, la CryptoAPI est utilisée au travers des « Cryptographic Service Provider », composants fournit par Microsoft dans Windows ou des externes tels que des fournisseurs tiers de carte à puce. Ils gèrent la génération, le stockage, les droits d'accès, et l'utilisation d'objets cryptographiques. Les CSP masquent l'implémentation des algorithmes, ils sont interchangeables et l'on peut suivant sa configuration utiliser un CSP logiciel ou matériel.
s | SQRL Secure Quick Reliable Login The user experience: Wishing to login to an online service where an “SQRL” code appears nearby: Even though it is THAT simple, it is FARmore secure than any other login solution.(We'll define exactly what “far more secure” means, below.) What happened behind the scenes? Summarizing this for your next cocktail party: “The website's login presents a QR code containing the URL of its authentication service, plus a nonce. This simple and straightforward SQRL protocolyields a surprising array of features and benefits: Anonymous Identification & Authentication: SQRL ID: Visitors to a website are uniquely identified by an absolutely anonymous SQRL ID. SQRL IDs are both user AND site specific: Although the same user always presents the same ID to the same site, they present an entirely different ID to every other site they visit. No annoying account creation: Suppose you wish to simply comment on a blog posting. Inherent Protection From Hackers: SQRL gives websites no secrets to keep. Yes.
Cryptographie appliquée en .Net : La gestion des certificats Lors du précédent article nous avons vu comment le Framework gère les clés de chiffrement. Les clés isolées de tout contexte rendent énormément de service, mais lorsqu'elles sont attachées à un certificat électronique, elles peuvent être exploitées au maximum de leur potentiel. Pour simplifier, je vais reprendre une définition de certificat que l'on peut trouver sur Wikipedia : Un certificat électronique est une carte d'identité électronique dont l'objet est d'identifier un utilisateur ou un équipement informatique. Le Framework représente les certificats par la classe X509Certificate2, une spécialisation de la classe X509Certificate déjà présente dans le Framework 1.1. Les certificats sont organisés dans Windows dans des « magasins », chaque magasin possède une portée (utilisateur local, machine) et une fonction (certificats de l'utilisateur, certificats des autorités de confiance...).
Specifications Overview | FIDO Alliance The specifications are broken into two categories, U2F and UAF. As these documents are still actively being edited and refined, we encourage you to stay informed by providing us with your email address, which will only be used for this purpose, and may be removed from our mailing list at any time. For the latest revisions will always be available on the specifications download page. FIDO provides two user experiences to address a wide range of use cases and deployment scenarios. FIDO protocols are based on public key cryptography and are strongly resistant to phishing. Passwordless UX (UAF) User carries client device with UAF stack installed User presents a local biometric or PIN Website can choose whether to retain password The passwordless FIDO experience is supported by the Universal Authentication Framework (UAF) protocol. Once registered, the user simply repeats the local authentication action whenever they need to authenticate to the service. Second Factor UX (U2F) FIDO Registration