Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy abduction (Igor Douven) Abelard [Abailard], Peter (Peter King) Abhidharma (Noa Ronkin) abilities (John Maier) Abner of Burgos (Shalom Sadik) Abrabanel, Judah (Aaron Hughes) abstract objects (Gideon Rosen) accidental properties — see essential vs. accidental properties action (George Wilson and Samuel Shpall) action-based theories of perception (Robert Briscoe and Rick Grush) action at a distance — see quantum mechanics: action at a distance in actualism (Christopher Menzel) adaptationism (Steven Hecht Orzack and Patrick Forber) Addams, Jane (Maurice Hamington) Adorno, Theodor W. (Lambert Zuidervaart) advance directives (Agnieszka Jaworska) Aegidius Romanus — see Giles of Rome Aenesidemus — see skepticism: ancient aesthetic, concept of the (James Shelley) aesthetics aesthetics of the everyday (Yuriko Saito) affirmative action (Robert Fullinwider) Africana Philosophy (Lucius T. Outlaw Jr.) B [jump to top] C [jump to top] D [jump to top] Damian, Peter (Toivo J.
Rationality: From AI to Zombies - Lesswrongwiki Ebook cover image. Rationality: From AI to Zombies is a 2015 ebook by Eliezer Yudkowsky on human rationality and irrationality in cognitive science. The ebook can be downloaded on a "pay-what-you-want" basis from intelligence.org or viewed on the website readthesequences.com It is an edited and reorganized version of the Sequences, a series of blog posts published to Less Wrong and Overcoming Bias between 2006 and 2009. Rationality: From AI to Zombies serves as a long-form introduction to formative ideas behind Less Wrong, the Machine Intelligence Research Institute, the Center for Applied Rationality, and substantial parts of the effective altruism community. Contents The ebook's contents are organized into six books, containing a total of 333 essays from the Sequences. Book I: Map and TerritoryA. Each book also comes with an introduction by Rob Bensinger, and a supplemental essay by Yudkowsky. Links
Less Wrong: The Terrible, Horrible, No Good, Very Bad Truth Abou Joshua Greene has a PhD thesis called The Terrible, Horrible, No Good, Very Bad Truth About Morality and What To Do About It. What is this terrible truth? The essence of this truth is that many, many people (probably most people) believe that their particular moral (and axiological) views on the world are objectively true - for example that anyone who disagrees with the statement "black people have the same value as any other human beings" has committed either an error of logic or has got some empirical fact wrong, in the same way that people who claim that the earth was created 6000 years ago are objectively wrong. To put it another way, Greene's contention is that our entire way of talking about ethics - the very words that we use - force us into talking complete nonsense (often in a very angry way) about ethics. As an accessible entry point, I have decided to summarize what I consider to be Greene's most important points in this post.
Description de Controverses | Mines-ParisTech | Cycle Ingénieur – Civil | Cours Première Année Le site web du cours “Description de controverses” propose l’ensemble des informations et outils utiles à la compréhension et à la réalisation des objectifs du cours. La rubrique “Présentation” décrit l’objet du cours.La rubrique “Organisation” indique le fonctionnement général du cours : calendrier, contenu des séances, répartition par groupes de controverse, responsabilités des élèves.
Experimental Philosophy I've been thinking a great deal lately about how best to study moral judgment. Let me say a few things myself, but I hope others will be able to chime in and share ideas, especially since I'm in the process of designing some studies. What's best to measure? So far it seems most researchers focus on measuring something other than what we might call purely "evaluative judgments," such as whether someone did something good or bad. This seems right to me since these don't necessarily constitute judgments about whether an action is right or wrong, which is paradigmatically a moral verdict. Moreover, this just seems to be the main target of most people doing research on moral judgment. So I think rightly the focus has been instead on what we might call "deontic judgments" such as whether an act is right/wrong, permissible/impermissible, etc. How best to measure it? Some researchers present participants with a forced, dichotomous choice. Another approach is to present subjects with scales.
Everything Studies – I have an abstraction problem Less Wrong: You cannot be mistaken about (not) wanting to wirehe In the comments of Welcome to Heaven, Wei Dai brings up the argument that even though we may not want to be wireheaded now, our wireheaded selves would probably prefer to be wireheaded. Therefore we might be mistaken about what we really want. (Correction: what Wei actually said was that an FAI might tell us that we would prefer to be wireheaded if we knew what it felt like, not that our wireheaded selves would prefer to be wireheaded.) This is an argument I've heard frequently, one which I've even used myself. To take the example of wireheading. The systems for experiencing pleasure and for wanting to seek out pleasure are separate ones. Therefore, it is not an inherent property of wireheading that we'd automatically end up wanting it. If you're not convinced about that last bit, consider the case of "anti-wireheading": we rewire somebody so that they experience terrible, horrible, excruciating pain. You can still be mistaken about whether or not you'll like something, of course.
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