Jerry Fodor

Ludwig Wittgenstein 1. Biographical Sketch Wittgenstein was born on April 26, 1889 in Vienna, Austria, to a wealthy industrial family, well-situated in intellectual and cultural Viennese circles. In 1908 he began his studies in aeronautical engineering at Manchester University where his interest in the philosophy of pure mathematics led him to Frege. Upon Frege's advice, in 1911 he went to Cambridge to study with Bertrand Russell. Russell wrote, upon meeting Wittgenstein: “An unknown German appeared … obstinate and perverse, but I think not stupid” (quoted by Monk 1990: 38f). During his years in Cambridge, from 1911 to 1913, Wittgenstein conducted several conversations on philosophy and the foundations of logic with Russell, with whom he had an emotional and intense relationship, as well as with Moore and Keynes. In the 1930s and 1940s Wittgenstein conducted seminars at Cambridge, developing most of the ideas that he intended to publish in his second book, Philosophical Investigations. 2. 3.

Neural processing for individual categories of objects Discrete categories of objects such as faces, body parts, tools, animals and buildings have been associated with preferential activation in specialised areas of the cerebral cortex, leading to the suggestion that they may be produced separately in discrete neural regions. Studies of patients with brain damage have revealed pure agnosic disorders that selectively impair recognition of specific object categories. Such agnosic disorders have been reported for faces (prosopagnosia), living vs. nonliving stimuli, fruits, vegetables, tools, and musical instruments among others, suggesting that such categories may be processed independently within the brain. Object-specific areas have been identified consistently across subjects and studies, however their responses are not always exclusive. It may be that the use of distinct brain regions for processing different object categories results from different processing requirements necessary for each class. See also[edit] References[edit]

Emmanuel Kant Un article de Wikipédia, l'encyclopédie libre. Emmanuel Kant Philosophe occidental Époque moderne Biographie[modifier | modifier le code] Emmanuel Kant naît en 1724 à Königsberg en Prusse-Orientale (actuellement Kaliningrad en Russie) dans un milieu modeste : son père, d'origine écossaise, est sellier, et sa mère, décrite par Kant comme une femme très intelligente, est foncièrement piétiste. C'est là qu'il découvre Newton et la physique, preuve selon lui qu'une science a priori de la nature est possible (c’est-à-dire les mathématiques et la physique)[2]. En 1746, la mort de son père l’oblige à interrompre ses études pour donner des cours : il est engagé comme précepteur par des familles aisées et il accomplit cette tâche durant neuf ans. En 1755, il obtient une promotion universitaire et une habilitation grâce à une dissertation sur les principes premiers de la connaissance métaphysique. En 1781 paraît la première édition de la Critique de la raison pure.

Daniel Dennett Daniel Clement Dennett III (born March 28, 1942)[1][2] is an American philosopher, writer, and cognitive scientist whose research centers on the philosophy of mind, philosophy of science and philosophy of biology, particularly as those fields relate to evolutionary biology and cognitive science.[3] Early life and education[edit] Dennett was born on March 28, 1942 in Boston, Massachusetts, the son of Ruth Marjorie (née Leck) and Daniel Clement Dennett, Jr.[6][7] Dennett spent part of his childhood in Lebanon, where, during World War II, his father was a covert counter-intelligence agent with the Office of Strategic Services posing as a cultural attaché to the American Embassy in Beirut.[8] When he was five, his mother took him back to Massachusetts after his father died in an unexplained plane crash.[9] Dennett says that he was first introduced to the notion of philosophy while attending summer camp at age 11, when a camp counselor said to him, "You know what you are, Daniel? First ...

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Simulation modeling Simulation modeling is the process of creating and analyzing a digital prototype of a physical model to predict its performance in the real world. Simulation modeling is used to help designers and engineers understand whether, under what conditions, and in which ways a part could fail and what loads it can withstand. Simulation modeling can also help predict fluid flow and heat transfer patterns. Uses of Simulation Modeling[edit] Simulation modeling allows designers and engineers to avoid repeated building of multiple physical prototypes to analyze designs for new or existing parts. Before creating the physical prototype, users can virtually investigate many digital prototypes. Typical Simulation Modeling Workflow[edit] Simulation modeling follows a process much like this: Use a 2D or 3D CAD tool to develop a virtual model, also known as a digital prototype, to represent a design.Generate a 2D or 3D mesh for analysis calculations. Simulation Modeling Software Programs[edit] References[edit]

Stephen Kosslyn Un article de Wikipédia, l'encyclopédie libre. Stephen Michael Kosslyn est un psychologue américain né en 1948. Il est actuellement John Lindsley Professor of Psychology in Memory of William James et doyen de Science Sociale à l'université Harvard ainsi que chercheur dans les domaines de la psychologie cognitive et des neurosciences cognitives. Stephen Kosslyn reçoit son Bachelor of Arts de psychologie en 1970 à l'UCLA et son doctorat en psychologie en 1974 à l'université Stanford ; son directeur de thèse est Gordon Bower. Il est surtout connu pour ses recherches et théories en imagerie mentale. Stephen Kosslyn a reçu plusieurs distinctions pour ses recherches, notamment le National Academy of Sciences Initiatives in Research Award et le Prix Jean-Louis Signoret. Articles connexes[modifier | modifier le code] Imagerie mentale Liens externes[modifier | modifier le code] Portail de la psychologie

Paul Churchland Paul Churchland (born October 21, 1942) is a Canadian philosopher noted for his studies in neurophilosophy and the philosophy of mind.[1] He is Professor Emeritus at the University of California, San Diego, where he held the Valtz Chair of Philosophy[2] and a joint appointment with the Cognitive Science Faculty and the Institute for Neural Computation.[3] He earned his Ph.D. from the University of Pittsburgh in 1969 under the direction of Wilfrid Sellars.[4] Churchland is the husband of philosopher Patricia Churchland. He is also the father of two children, Mark and Anne Churchland, both of whom are neuroscientists.[5][6][7] Professional career[edit] Philosophical views[edit] Just as modern science has discarded such notions as legends or witchcraft, Churchland holds the belief that a future, fully matured neuroscience is likely to have no need for "beliefs" (see propositional attitudes). Works[edit] Books[edit] Essays[edit] See also[edit] References[edit] External links[edit]

The Turing Test First published Wed Apr 9, 2003; substantive revision Wed Jan 26, 2011 The phrase “The Turing Test” is most properly used to refer to a proposal made by Turing (1950) as a way of dealing with the question whether machines can think. According to Turing, the question whether machines can think is itself “too meaningless” to deserve discussion (442). However, if we consider the more precise—and somehow related—question whether a digital computer can do well in a certain kind of game that Turing describes (“The Imitation Game”), then—at least in Turing's eyes—we do have a question that admits of precise discussion. Moreover, as we shall see, Turing himself thought that it would not be too long before we did have digital computers that could “do well” in the Imitation Game. The phrase “The Turing Test” is sometimes used more generally to refer to some kinds of behavioural tests for the presence of mind, or thought, or intelligence in putatively minded entities. 1. 2.

Steve Furber Stephen Byram "Steve" Furber CBE, FRS, FREng (born 1953) is the ICL Professor of Computer Engineering at the School of Computer Science at the University of Manchester[61] and is probably best known for his work at Acorn Computers, where he was one of the designers of the BBC Micro and the ARM 32-bit RISC microprocessor.[3][62][63][57][64][65][66] Education[edit] Furber was educated at Manchester Grammar School and represented the UK in the International Mathematical Olympiad in Hungary in 1970 and won a bronze medal.[67] He went on to study the Cambridge Mathematical Tripos at St John's College, Cambridge, receiving a Bachelor of Arts degree in mathematics in 1974. In 1978, he was appointed the Rolls-Royce Research Fellow in Aerodynamics at Emmanuel College, Cambridge and was awarded a PhD in 1980 on the fluid dynamics of the Weis-Fogh principle.[68][69] Acorn Computers, BBC Micro and ARM[edit] Research[edit] Awards and honours[edit] Furber's nomination for the Royal Society reads:

Wolfgang Köhler Un article de Wikipédia, l'encyclopédie libre. Wolfgang Köhler (Tallinn, - ) est un psychologue allemand et l'un des fondateurs de la psychologie de la forme avec Max Wertheimer et Kurt Koffka. Biographie[modifier | modifier le code] Wolfgang Köhler est né à Tallinn en Estonie de parents allemands. Il continue ses recherches sur l'audition à l'université de Francfort où il rencontre Max Wertheimer et Kurt Koffka, les deux autres fondateurs de la psychologie de la forme. À l'arrivée au pouvoir des nazis, il critique ouvertement leur politique raciste puis se voit contraint de quitter définitivement l'Allemagne en 1935. Il a reçu le premier Distinguished Scientific Contribution Award de l'American Psychological Association, organisation dont il est ensuite devenu le président. Le phénomène d'Insight[modifier | modifier le code] Article détaillé : Insight Isomorphisme psychophysique[modifier | modifier le code] Bibliographie[modifier | modifier le code] W.

Eliminative materialism Eliminativists argue that modern belief in the existence of mental phenomena is analogous to the ancient belief in obsolete theories such as the geocentric model of the universe. Eliminativism stands in opposition to reductive materialism, which argues that a mental state is well defined, and that further research will result in a more detailed, but not different understanding.[3] An intermediate position is revisionary materialism, which will often argue that the mental state in question will prove to be somewhat reducible to physical phenomena - with some changes to the common sense concept. Eliminativism about a class of entities is the view that that class of entities does not exist.[4] For example, all forms of materialism are eliminativist about the soul; modern chemists are eliminativist about phlogiston; and modern physicists are eliminativist about the existence of luminiferous aether. Overview[edit] Philosophers who argue against eliminativism may take several approaches.