Anomie
For Durkheim, anomie arises more generally from a mismatch between personal or group standards and wider social standards, or from the lack of a social ethic, which produces moral deregulation and an absence of legitimate aspirations. This is a nurtured condition: Most sociologists associate the term with Durkheim, who used the concept to speak of the ways in which an individual's actions are matched, or integrated, with a system of social norms and practices… anomie is a mismatch, not simply the absence of norms. Thus, a society with too much rigidity and little individual discretion could also produce a kind of anomie... Thus, fatalistic suicide arises when a person is too rule-governed... History[edit] In 1893, Durkheim introduced the concept of anomie to describe the mismatch of collective guild labour to evolving societal needs when the guild was homogeneous in its constituency. Etymology[edit] Social disorder[edit] Literature, film, and theatre[edit] See also[edit] References[edit]
On What There Is
A curious thing about the ontological problem is its simplicity. It can be put in three Anglo-Saxon monosyllables: ‘What is there?’ It can be answered, moreover, in a word—‘Everything’—and everyone will accept this answer as true. Suppose now that two philosophers, McX and I, differ over ontology. When I try to formulate our difference of opinion, on the other hand, I seem to be in a predicament. It would appear, if this reasoning were sound, that in any ontological dispute the proponent of the negative side suffers the disadvantage of not being able to admit that his opponent disagrees with him. This is the old Platonic riddle of nonbeing. It is some such line of thought that leads philosophers like McX to impute being where they might otherwise be quite content to recognize that there is nothing. McX cannot, indeed, quite persuade himself that any region of space-time, near or remote, contains a flying horse of flesh and blood. Wyman’s overpopulated universe is in many ways unlovely.
Two Dogmas of Empiricism
Willard Van Orman Quine Originally published in The Philosophical Review 60 (1951): 20-43. Reprinted in W.V.O. Quine, From a Logical Point of View (Harvard University Press, 1953; second, revised, edition 1961), with the following alterations: "The version printed here diverges from the original in footnotes and in other minor respects: §§1 and 6 have been abridged where they encroach on the preceding essay ["On What There Is"], and §§3-4 have been expanded at points." Except for minor changes, additions and deletions are indicated in interspersed tables. Modern empiricism has been conditioned in large part by two dogmas. Kant's cleavage between analytic and synthetic truths was foreshadowed in Hume's distinction between relations of ideas and matters of fact, and in Leibniz's distinction between truths of reason and truths of fact. Kant conceived of an analytic statement as one that attributes to its subject no more than is already conceptually contained in the subject. Notes 1a. 2a.
Ego depletion
Ego depletion refers to the idea that self-control or willpower draw upon a limited pool of mental resources that can be used up.[1] When the energy for mental activity is low, self-control is typically impaired, which would be considered a state of ego depletion. In particular, experiencing a state of ego depletion impairs the ability to control oneself later on. A depleting task requiring self-control can have a hindering effect on a subsequent self-control task, even if the tasks are seemingly unrelated. Self-control plays a valuable role in the functioning of the self on both individualistic and interpersonal levels. Ego depletion is therefore a critical topic in experimental psychology, specifically social psychology, because it is a mechanism that contributes to the understanding of the processes of human self-control. Key experimental evidence[edit] Physiological correlates[edit] The role of glucose as a specific form of energy needed for self-control has been explored. Mood[edit]
