Fact Etymology and usage The word fact derives from the Latin factum, and was first used in English with the same meaning: "a thing done or performed", a use that is now obsolete.[1] The common usage of "something that has really occurred or is the case" dates from the middle of the sixteenth century.[2] Fact is sometimes used synonymously with truth, as distinct from opinions, falsehoods, or matters of taste. This use is found in such phrases as, It is a fact that the cup is blue or Matter of fact,[3] and "... not history, nor fact, but imagination." Fact also indicates a matter under discussion deemed to be true or correct, such as to emphasize a point or prove a disputed issue; (e.g., "... the fact of the matter is ...").[5][6] Alternatively, fact may also indicate an allegation or stipulation of something that may or may not be a "true fact",[7] (e.g., "the author's facts are not trustworthy"). Fact in philosophy Correspondence and the slingshot argument Compound facts Fact–value distinction
Thomas Kuhn Thomas Samuel Kuhn (/ˈkuːn/; July 18, 1922 – June 17, 1996) was an American physicist, historian, and philosopher of science whose controversial 1962 book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions was deeply influential in both academic and popular circles, introducing the term "paradigm shift", which has since become an English-language staple. Life[edit] Kuhn was born in Cincinnati, Ohio, to Samuel L. Kuhn, an industrial engineer, and Minette Stroock Kuhn. Thomas Kuhn was married twice, first to Kathryn Muhs with whom he had three children, then to Jehane Barton Burns (Jehane R. Kuhn was an agnostic.[4] His family was Jewish on both sides. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions[edit] The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (SSR) was originally printed as an article in the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, published by the logical positivists of the Vienna Circle. Polanyi–Kuhn debate[edit] Thomas Kuhn Paradigm Shift Award[edit] Honors[edit] Bibliography[edit] References[edit]
Philosophy of science Philosophy of science is a branch of philosophy concerned with the foundations, methods, and implications of science. The central questions concern what counts as science, the reliability of scientific theories, and the purpose of science. This discipline overlaps with metaphysics, ontology and epistemology, for example, when it explores the relationship between science and truth. While the relevant history of philosophy dates back at least to Aristotle, philosophy of science emerged as a distinct discipline only in the middle of the 20th century in the wake of logical positivism, a movement that aimed to formulate criteria to ensure all philosophical statements' meaningfulness and objectively assess them. Today, some thinkers seek to ground science in axiomatic assumptions such as the uniformity of nature. Introduction[edit] Defining science[edit] Karl Popper c. 1980s Distinguishing between science and non-science is referred to as the demarcation problem. Scientific explanation[edit]
Hypothetico-deductive model The hypothetico-deductive model or method is a proposed description of scientific method . According to it, scientific inquiry proceeds by formulating a hypothesis in a form that could conceivably be falsified by a test on observable data. A test that could and does run contrary to predictions of the hypothesis is taken as a falsification of the hypothesis. Example [ edit ] One example of an algorithmic statement of the hypothetico-deductive method is as follows: [ 1 ] 1 . 2 . 3 . 4 . One possible sequence in this model would be 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 . Note that this method can never absolutely verify (prove the truth of) 2 . Discussion [ edit ] Additionally, as pointed out by Carl Hempel (1905–1997), this simple view of the scientific method is incomplete; a conjecture can also incorporate probabilities, e.g., the drug is effective about 70% of the time. [ 5 ] Tests, in this case, must be repeated to substantiate the conjecture (in particular, the probabilities). Citations [ edit ]
Willard Van Orman Quine Willard Van Orman Quine (June 25, 1908 – December 25, 2000) (known to intimates as "Van")[1] was an American philosopher and logician in the analytic tradition. From 1930 until his death 70 years later, Quine was continually affiliated with Harvard University in one way or another, first as a student, then as a professor of philosophy and a teacher of logic and set theory, and finally as a professor emeritus who published or revised several books in retirement. He filled the Edgar Pierce Chair of Philosophy at Harvard from 1956 to 1978. Biography[edit] According to his autobiography, The Time of My Life (1986), Quine grew up in Akron, Ohio, where he lived with his parents and older brother Robert C. It was through Quine's good offices that Alfred Tarski was invited to attend the September 1939 Unity of Science Congress in Cambridge. Quine had four children by two marriages.[1] Guitarist Robert Quine was his nephew. Political beliefs[edit] Work[edit] Existence and Its contrary[edit] .
Paul Feyerabend Paul Karl Feyerabend (German: [ˈfaɪɐˌaːbɛnt]; January 13, 1924 – February 11, 1994) was an Austrian-born philosopher of science best known for his work as a professor of philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley, where he worked for three decades (1958–1989). He lived at various times in England, the United States, New Zealand, Italy, Germany, and finally Switzerland. His major works include Against Method (published in 1975), Science in a Free Society (published in 1978) and Farewell to Reason (a collection of papers published in 1987). Feyerabend became famous for his purportedly anarchistic view of science and his rejection of the existence of universal methodological rules.[1] He is an influential figure in the philosophy of science, and also in the sociology of scientific knowledge. Biography[edit] Early life[edit] Post–WWII and university[edit] When the war was over, Feyerabend first got a temporary job in Apolda where he wrote pieces for the theatre. Academia[edit]
Cross-validation (statistics) Statistical model validation technique Example: linear regression [edit] In linear regression, there exist real response values , and n p-dimensional vector covariates x1, ..., xn. The components of the vector xi are denoted xi1, ..., xip. In most other regression procedures (e.g. logistic regression), there is no simple formula to compute the expected out-of-sample fit. Two types of cross-validation can be distinguished: exhaustive and non-exhaustive cross-validation. Exhaustive cross-validation Exhaustive cross-validation methods are cross-validation methods which learn and test on all possible ways to divide the original sample into a training and a validation set. Leave-p-out cross-validation LpO cross-validation require training and validating the model times, where n is the number of observations in the original sample, and where is the binomial coefficient. Leave-one-out cross-validation LOO cross-validation requires less computation time than LpO cross-validation because there are only .
Jürgen Habermas Biography[edit] Habermas was born in Düsseldorf, Rhine Province, in 1929. He was born with a cleft palate and had corrective surgery twice during childhood.[4] Habermas argues that his speech disability made him think differently about the importance of communication and prefer writing over the spoken word as a medium.[5] From 1956 on, he studied philosophy and sociology under the critical theorists Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno at the Goethe University Frankfurt's Institute for Social Research, but because of a rift between the two over his dissertation—Horkheimer had made unacceptable demands for revision—as well as his own belief that the Frankfurt School had become paralyzed with political skepticism and disdain for modern culture[6]—he finished his habilitation in political science at the University of Marburg under the Marxist Wolfgang Abendroth. Habermas then returned to his chair at Frankfurt and the directorship of the Institute for Social Research. Teacher and mentor[edit]
Philosophy of mind A phrenological mapping[1] of the brain – phrenology was among the first attempts to correlate mental functions with specific parts of the brain Philosophy of mind is a branch of philosophy that studies the nature of the mind, mental events, mental functions, mental properties, consciousness, and their relationship to the physical body, particularly the brain. The mind–body problem, i.e. the relationship of the mind to the body, is commonly seen as one key issue in philosophy of mind, although there are other issues concerning the nature of the mind that do not involve its relation to the physical body, such as how consciousness is possible and the nature of particular mental states.[2][3][4] Mind–body problem[edit] Our perceptual experiences depend on stimuli that arrive at our various sensory organs from the external world, and these stimuli cause changes in our mental states, ultimately causing us to feel a sensation, which may be pleasant or unpleasant. Arguments for dualism[edit]
Text mining A typical application is to scan a set of documents written in a natural language and either model the document set for predictive classification purposes or populate a database or search index with the information extracted. Text mining and text analytics[edit] The term text analytics describes a set of linguistic, statistical, and machine learning techniques that model and structure the information content of textual sources for business intelligence, exploratory data analysis, research, or investigation.[1] The term is roughly synonymous with text mining; indeed, Ronen Feldman modified a 2000 description of "text mining"[2] in 2004 to describe "text analytics. The term text analytics also describes that application of text analytics to respond to business problems, whether independently or in conjunction with query and analysis of fielded, numerical data. History[edit] Text analysis processes[edit] Subtasks — components of a larger text-analytics effort — typically include: Software[edit]
John Rawls John Bordley Rawls (/rɔːlz/;[1] February 21, 1921 – November 24, 2002) was an American philosopher and a leading figure in moral and political philosophy. He held the James Bryant Conant University Professorship at Harvard University and the Fulbright Fellowship at Christ Church, Oxford. Rawls received both the Schock Prize for Logic and Philosophy and the National Humanities Medal in 1999, the latter presented by President Bill Clinton, in recognition of how Rawls' work "helped a whole generation of learned Americans revive their faith in democracy itself."[2] Biography[edit] Early life[edit] John Rawls was born in Baltimore, Maryland to William Lee Rawls, "one of the most prominent attorneys in Baltimore,"[3] and Anna Abell Stump Rawls.[6] The second of five sons, tragedy struck Rawls at a young age. Rawls attended school in Baltimore for a short time before transferring to Kent School, an Episcopalian preparatory school in Connecticut. Career[edit] Later life[edit]
Rudolf Carnap Rudolf Carnap (May 18, 1891 – September 14, 1970) was a German-born philosopher who was active in Europe before 1935 and in the United States thereafter. He was a major member of the Vienna Circle and an advocate of logical positivism. Life and work[edit] Carnap's Birthplace in Wuppertal Carnap's father had risen from the status of a poor ribbon-weaver to become the owner of a ribbon-making factory. In 1928, Carnap published two important books: The Logical Structure of the World (German: "Der logische Aufbau der Welt"), in which he developed a rigorous formal version of empiricism, defining all scientific terms in phenomenalistic terms. In February 1930 Tarski lectured in Vienna, and during November 1930 Carnap visited Warsaw. Carnap, whose socialist and pacifist beliefs put him at risk in Nazi Germany, emigrated to the United States in 1935 and became a naturalized citizen in 1941. Carnap taught himself Esperanto when he was 14 years of age, and remained sympathetic to it (Carnap 1963).
Algorithm Flow chart of an algorithm (Euclid's algorithm) for calculating the greatest common divisor (g.c.d.) of two numbers a and b in locations named A and B. The algorithm proceeds by successive subtractions in two loops: IF the test B ≥ A yields "yes" (or true) (more accurately the numberb in location B is greater than or equal to the numbera in location A) THEN, the algorithm specifies B ← B − A (meaning the number b − a replaces the old b). Similarly, IF A > B, THEN A ← A − B. The process terminates when (the contents of) B is 0, yielding the g.c.d. in A. (Algorithm derived from Scott 2009:13; symbols and drawing style from Tausworthe 1977). In mathematics and computer science, an algorithm ( i/ˈælɡərɪðəm/ AL-gə-ri-dhəm) is a step-by-step procedure for calculations. Informal definition[edit] While there is no generally accepted formal definition of "algorithm," an informal definition could be "a set of rules that precisely defines a sequence of operations Formalization[edit]
Jacques Derrida Jacques Derrida (/ʒɑːk ˈdɛrɨdə/; French: [ʒak dɛʁida]; born Jackie Élie Derrida;[1] July 15, 1930 – October 9, 2004) was a French philosopher, born in French Algeria. Derrida is best known for developing a form of semiotic analysis known as deconstruction. He is one of the major figures associated with post-structuralism and postmodern philosophy.[3][4][5] During his career Derrida published more than 40 books, together with hundreds of essays and public presentations. He had a significant influence upon the humanities and social sciences, including—in addition to philosophy and literature—law[6][7][8] anthropology,[9] historiography,[10] linguistics,[11] sociolinguistics,[12] psychoanalysis, political theory, feminism, and queer studies. Particularly in his later writings, he frequently addressed ethical and political themes present in his work. Life[edit] Derrida was the third of five children. Derrida traveled widely and held a series of visiting and permanent positions.
Absolutely no amount of experimentation can ever prove me right; a single experiment can prove me wrong. Thanx Einstein. by ramasysdev Apr 28
The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1972, 3rd edn.) that the nature of scientific method is hypothetico–deductive and not, as is generally believed, inductive. by raviii Apr 28