Rationalism In epistemology, rationalism is the view that "regards reason as the chief source and test of knowledge"[1] or "any view appealing to reason as a source of knowledge or justification".[2] More formally, rationalism is defined as a methodology or a theory "in which the criterion of the truth is not sensory but intellectual and deductive".[3] Rationalists believe reality has an intrinsically logical structure. Because of this, rationalists argue that certain truths exist and that the intellect can directly grasp these truths. That is to say, rationalists assert that certain rational principles exist in logic, mathematics, ethics, and metaphysics that are so fundamentally true that denying them causes one to fall into contradiction. Philosophical usage[edit] Rationalism is often contrasted with empiricism. Theory of justification[edit] The theory of justification is the part of epistemology that attempts to understand the justification of propositions and beliefs. The other two theses[edit]
Mental representation Hypothetical internal cognitive symbol that represents external reality A mental representation (or cognitive representation), in philosophy of mind, cognitive psychology, neuroscience, and cognitive science, is a hypothetical internal cognitive symbol that represents external reality or its abstractions.[1][2] Mental representation is the mental imagery of things that are not actually present to the senses.[3] In contemporary philosophy, specifically in fields of metaphysics such as philosophy of mind and ontology, a mental representation is one of the prevailing ways of explaining and describing the nature of ideas and concepts. Mental representations (or mental imagery) enable representing things that have never been experienced as well as things that do not exist.[4] Our brains and mental imageries allow us to imagine things have either never happened or are impossible and do not exist. Representational theories of mind[edit] Canadian philosopher P. Responses[edit] Philosophers[edit]
Magic Can Increase Belief in Pseudoscience Magicians play a significant role in the skeptical movement. They have, as Liam Neeson famously said, a particular set of skills. They are very adept at deception, using techniques that have been honed through trial and error over centuries. But at the same time some stage magicians make skeptics uncomfortable by not being entirely upfront with their audience. Magicians typically create a narrative by which they “explain” their tricks to the audience. In the gray zone are those like Derren Brown. The question is – is there any harm in deceiving an audience about the true nature of such magic tricks? Empirical studies, indeed, show that the experience of a magic performance can impact our cognitive and affective functioning. What about adults? There is a big “however” here, though. But what about the pseudo-psychological narrative? This paper tested the impact of a pseudo-psychological demonstration on people’s beliefs in implausible psychological principles. What about magicians?
Problems of Philosophy: Chapter 13 - Knowledge, Error, and Probable Opinion Summary In this chapter, Russell continues his discussion of knowledge of truths. He has just established a criterion for what we mean by truth and now turns to the more interesting question concerning how we can know what is true from what is false. Since it is plain that some of our beliefs are erroneous, it becomes difficult to regard any unexamined belief with certainty. What we must ask ourselves now is: "can we ever know anything at all"? He begins by positing "true belief" as a definition for knowledge. The remaining alternative seems to be that "nothing is knowledge except what is validly deduced from true premises." One objection to the definition is that "it unduly limits knowledge." At this point Russell declares that the major difficulty that arises with respect to knowledge does not involve the derivative kind, rather the intuitive. The possibility for self-evidence in our truths contains a sense in which a truth may be judged infallible.
Empiricism John Locke, a leading philosopher of British empiricism Empiricism is a theory which states that knowledge comes only or primarily from sensory experience.[1] One of several views of epistemology, the study of human knowledge, along with rationalism and skepticism, empiricism emphasizes the role of experience and evidence, especially sensory experience, in the formation of ideas, over the notion of innate ideas or traditions;[2] empiricists may argue however that traditions (or customs) arise due to relations of previous sense experiences.[3] Empiricism, often used by natural scientists, says that "knowledge is based on experience" and that "knowledge is tentative and probabilistic, subject to continued revision and falsification."[4] One of the epistemological tenets is that sensory experience creates knowledge. Etymology[edit] History[edit] Background[edit] A central concept in science and the scientific method is that it must be empirically based on the evidence of the senses.
Information The ASCII codes for the word "Wikipedia" represented in binary, the numeral system most commonly used for encoding textual computer information In Thermodynamics, information is any kind of event that affects the state of a dynamic system that can interpret the information. Etymology[edit] The English word was apparently derived from the Latin stem (information-) of the nominative (informatio): this noun is derived from the verb informare (to inform) in the sense of "to give form to the mind", "to discipline", "instruct", "teach". The ancient Greek word for form was μορφή (morphe; cf. morph) and also εἶδος (eidos) "kind, idea, shape, set", the latter word was famously used in a technical philosophical sense by Plato (and later Aristotle) to denote the ideal identity or essence of something (see Theory of Forms). Information theory approach[edit] As sensory input[edit] Often information can be viewed as a type of input to an organism or system. As representation and complexity[edit]
Fake science: The impact of pseudo-psychological demonstrations on people’s beliefs in psychological principles Abstract Magicians use deception to create effects that allow us to experience the impossible. More recently, magicians have started to contextualize these tricks in psychological demonstrations. We investigated whether witnessing a magic demonstration alters people’s beliefs in these pseudo-psychological principles. In the classroom, a magician claimed to use psychological skills to read a volunteer’s thoughts. After this demonstration, participants reported higher beliefs that an individual can 1) read a person’s mind by evaluating micro expressions, psychological profiles and muscle activities, and 2) effectively prime a person’s behaviour through subtle suggestions. Citation: Lan Y, Mohr C, Hu X, Kuhn G (2018) Fake science: The impact of pseudo-psychological demonstrations on people’s beliefs in psychological principles. Editor: Valerio Capraro, Middlesex University, UNITED KINGDOM Received: July 31, 2018; Accepted: November 2, 2018; Published: November 27, 2018 Introduction Method
Cartesian doubt Form of methodological skepticism associated with the writings and methodology of René Descartes Cartesian doubt is a form of methodological skepticism associated with the writings and methodology of René Descartes (March 31, 1596–February 11, 1650).[1][2]: 88 Cartesian doubt is also known as Cartesian skepticism, methodic doubt, methodological skepticism, universal doubt, systematic doubt, or hyperbolic doubt. Cartesian doubt is a systematic process of being skeptical about (or doubting) the truth of one's beliefs, which has become a characteristic method in philosophy.[3]: 403 Additionally, Descartes' method has been seen by many as the root of the modern scientific method. This method of doubt was largely popularized in Western philosophy by René Descartes, who sought to doubt the truth of all beliefs in order to determine which he could be certain were true. Characteristics[edit] Cartesian doubt is methodological. Technique[edit] Descartes' method[edit] The dream argument[edit]