http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_mind
Metaphilosophy Relationship to philosophy[edit] Some philosophers consider metaphilosophy to be a subject apart from philosophy, above or beyond it,[4] while others object to that idea.[5] Timothy Williamson argues that the philosophy of philosophy is "automatically part of philosophy," as is the philosophy of anything else.[6] Nicholas Bunnin and Jiyuan Yu write that the separation of first- from second-order study has lost popularity as philosophers find it hard to observe the distinction.[8] As evidenced by these contrasting opinions, debate remains as to whether the evaluation of the nature of philosophy is 'second order philosophy' or simply 'plain philosophy'. Many philosophers have expressed doubts over the value of metaphilosophy.[9] Among them is Gilbert Ryle : "preoccupation with questions about methods tends to distract us from prosecuting the methods themselves. We run as a rule, worse, not better, if we think a lot about our feet. So let us... not speak of it all but just do it
Lucid Dreaming/Induction Techniques This page describes a number of lucid dream induction techniques. It is recommended that you be able to recall at least one dream per night in order to maximize the effectiveness of these methods. Preliminary Knowledge[edit]
Relation (history of concept) The concept of relation has a long and complicated history in philosophy. For the ancient Greeks the relation between one thing and another was just one of many ways in which any particular thing could be described. An interest was also developing at the time in the difference between the relations and the things themselves culminating in one view that the things in themselves cannot be known except through their relations. The debate continues into modern philosophy with further investigation into types of relation and whether relations exist only in the mind or the real world or both. An understanding of types of relation is important to an understanding of relations between many things including that between people, communities and the wider world.
The intuitional problem of consciousness Could a computer ever be conscious? I think so, at least in principle. Scientia Salon has seen a number of very interesting discussions on this theme which unfortunately have failed to shift anybody’s position [1]. Aesthetic relativism Aesthetic relativism is the philosophical view that the judgement of beauty is relative to different individuals and/or cultures and that there are no universal criteria of beauty. For example, in historical terms, the female form as depicted in the Venus of Willendorf and the women in the paintings of Rubens would today be regarded as over-weight, while the slim models on the covers of contemporary fashion magazines would no doubt be regarded in a negative light by our predecessors. In contemporary (cross-cultural) terms, body modification among "primitive" peoples is sometimes regarded as grotesque by Western society. Aesthetic relativism might be regarded as a sub-set of an overall philosophical relativism, which denies any absolute standards of truth or morality as well as of aesthetic judgement. (A frequently-cited source for philosophical relativism in postmodern theory is a fragment by Nietzsche, entitled "On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense.")
Intuition pump In the case of the Chinese Room argument, Dennett argues that the intuitive notion that a person manipulating symbols seems inadequate to constitute any form of consciousness ignores the requirements of memory, recall, emotion, world knowledge and rationality that the system would actually need to pass such a test. "Searle does not deny that programs can have all this structure, of course," Dennett says.[2] "He simply discourages us from attending to it. But if we are to do a good job imagining the case, we are not only entitled but obliged to imagine that the program Searle is hand-simulating has all this structure — and more, if only we can imagine it. But then it is no longer obvious, I trust, that there is no genuine understanding of the joke going on." A popular strategy in philosophy is to construct a certain sort of thought experiment I call an intuition pump [...].
Lucid Dreaming/Using Dream stabilization[edit] Once you are able to dream lucidly, you may find that it is difficult to stay in the dream; for example, you may wake instantly or the dream may start “fading” which is characterized by loss or degradation of any of the senses, especially vision. Alternatively, a new lucid dreamer could easily forget that they are in a dream, as a result of the shock of the sensation. Property (philosophy) Daniel Dennett distinguishes between lovely properties (such as loveliness itself), which, although they require an observer to be recognised, exist latently in perceivable objects; and suspect properties which have no existence at all until attributed by an observer (such as being a suspect in a murder enquiry)[3] Property dualism: the exemplification of two kinds of property by one kind of substance Property dualism describes a category of positions in the philosophy of mind which hold that, although the world is constituted of just one kind of substance—the physical kind—there exist two distinct kinds of properties: physical properties and mental properties. In other words, it is the view that non-physical, mental properties (such as beliefs, desires and emotions) inhere in some physical substances (namely brains). An intrinsic property is a property that an object or a thing has of itself, independently of other things, including its context. A relation is often considered[by whom?]
Research My work is on the nature of the self and mind, which I examine from the vantage point of issues in metaphysics, philosophy of mind, cognitive science, artificial intelligence (AI), philosophy of science, astrobiology and applied ethics. The topics I’ve written about most recently include the software approach to the mind, how the mathematical nature of physics undermines physicalism, artificial intelligence, and the nature of the person. For a brief overview of some of my work see this interview with 3AM Magazine. For other discussions of my work see pieces on my work that appeared in The New York Times, Wired, Humanity+, Big Think, 3 Quarks Daily, and Discover Magazine, (see “media”, above).
The Missing Shade of Blue The Missing Shade of Blue is an example introduced by the Scottish philosopher David Hume to show that it is at least conceivable that the mind can generate an idea without first being exposed to the relevant sensory experience. It is regarded as a problem by philosophers because it appears to stand in direct contradiction to what Hume had just written. The source of the problem[edit]